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 ILSE DEPRAETERE
 ON THE NECESSITY OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN
 (UN)BOUNDEDNESS AND (A)TELICITY'
 ABSTRACT. It is argued that two different types of concept are often intermingled in
 discussions of Aktionsart. The most common type of classification is one of situation types,
 relating to the potential actualisation of a situation, although some of the definitions have
 to do with the actual realization of the situation. This distinction, adequately captured by
 the notions (a)telicty and (un)boundedness (Declerck 1989), is explored and it is shown how
 NPs, PPs and tense influence a sentence's classification as (un)bounded.
 1. THE PROBLEM EXPOSED
 In an attempt to clarify and specify Vendler's distinction between states,
 activities, accomplishments and achievements, linguists have introduced
 further subdivisions and new labels to refer to the different subclasses.2
 This divergence of labels leads to terminological confusion in many cases.
 Moreover, a closer examination of the discussions reveals that two differ
 ent types of concepts are often intermingled in the classifications.3 This
 conceptual difference is apparent from Dowty's (1977) 'imperfective para
 dox': the use of a progressive form seemingly has the effect of taking away
 the built-in endpoint in sentences such as John was drawing a circle.
 Accordingly, this raises the question whether there is still reference to an
 accomplishment. Sentences like these clearly demonstrate the need for
 two different types of distinction (cf. Declerck 1989, pp. 277-278; 1991a,
 p. 121): a classification based on potential endpoints, which is labelled
 1 I wish to thank Prof. 0. Dahl, Prof. R. Declerck H. Devolder, Prof. J. Lindstedt, R.
 Vandekerckhove and Prof. E. Vorlat and the two anonymous referees for their comments on
 an earlier version of this paper.
 2 The following labels have been used to refer to situation types: Allen (1966): bounded vs.
 nonbounded; HeinAmAki (1978): durative, non-durative, accomplishment; Zydatiss (1976),
 Mourelatos (1981): process, event, state; Gabbay and Moravscik (1980): state vs. event; Dahl
 (1981): telic (bounded) vs. atelic (unbounded); Partee (1984): process, state, achievement,
 accomplishment; Schopf (1984): intial-determinierte Prozesse, initial und final determinierte
 Prozesse, punktuelle Ereignisse, punktuelle Veranderungen, unquantifizierte gerichtete Pro
 zesse, initial-determinierte Prozesse, accomplishment and achievement PrAdikate.
 3 Verkuyl (1989, p. 42) similarly points out that 'the use of the name of a Vendler-class
 does not warrant the conclusion that the concept related to this name is a Vendler-concept'.
 In her survey of taxonomies of situation types, Mommer (1986, pp. 12-59) also points out
 that there are (slight) differences in the nature of classifications.
 Linguistics and Philosophy 18: 1-19, 1995.
 ? 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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 2 ILSE DEPRAETERE
 (a)telicity, and one based on actual temporal boundaries, captured by the
 label (un)boundedness.
 2. (A)TELICITY AND (UN)BOUNDEDNESS DEFINED
 The definitions of (a)telicity and (un)boundedness hinge on the notions
 of endpoint or terminal point and temporal boundary. A situation may be
 limited in time: for instance, a situation of sunbathing may last for half
 an hour; it reaches a temporal boundary once the person in question
 leaves the beach. If someone runs a marathon, the endpoint to this parti
 cular situation is when the runner reaches the finish. A deliberate attempt
 to stay five minutes under a cold shower reaches its endpoint once the
 five minutes are over. Although endpoints of some kind are involved in
 each of the situations described, they are not completely similar. In the
 second case, unlike in the first, there is an endpoint inherent in the
 situation: no matter whether the runner manages to run 40 kilometres or
 not, the situation of running a marathon as such potentially implies a
 terminal point. The kind of endpoint which characterizes the third example
 is similar: after five minutes, the situation of staying under the water for
 five minutes is over. However, this does not necessarily mean that the
 terminal point is always actually reached. If someone says He is running
 a marathon or John is always boasting he can remain in ice-cold water. At
 the moment, he is staying under the cold water for five minutes the situations
 are not described as having reached their inherent/intended endpoint re
 spectively and hence there are not represented as having temporal boun
 daries. That is, even though the actual world situations must have a
 beginning and an end, there is no linguistic reference to these temporal
 boundaries. In the case of sunbathing, there is no inherent or intended
 endpoint similar to the one there is in the other two situations. Although
 it is over the moment the person in question leaves, the terminal point is
 not part of the semantics of sunbathing. The examples just given already
 show that a twofold distinction can be made:
 (I) + inherent/intended endpoint
 (a) + endpoint reached: + temporal boundary
 (b) - endpoint reached: - temporal boundary
 (II) - inherent/intended endpoint
 (a) + temporal boundary
 (b) - temporal boundary
 (A)telicity has to do with whether or not a situation is described as having
 an inherent or intended endpoint; (un)boundedness relates to whether or
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 (UN) BOUNDEDNESS AND (A)TELICITY 3
 not a situation is described as having reached a temporal boundary (cf.
 Declerck 1989, p. 277; 1991a, p. 121).
 So far, the focus has been on right-hand boundaries. It will be clear
 though that a particular sentence may represent a situation as (not) having
 a left-hand boundary as well: in I waited for her from five to eleven, unlike
 in At six o'clock, I was still waiting for her, the adverbial indicates the
 starting point of the situation. In the former case, the situation is repre
 sented as having a left-hand boundary, in the latter, it is not. In the case
 of (a)telicity, the focus is on endpoints; as far as (un)boundedness is
 concerned, however, a distinction can be made between situations that
 are bounded to the left and unbounded to the right (Suddenly, he was fast
 asleep), situations bounded to the right and unbounded to the left (I
 appreciated his presence until he told me he hated Jews) and those bounded
 on both sides (I worked in the garden from 2 till 5 o'clock).
 A clause is telic if the situation is described as having a natural (cf. (la)
 and (lb)) or an intended endpoint (cf. (lc)) which has to be reached for
 the situation as it is described in the sentence to be complete and beyond
 which it cannot continue. Otherwise it is atelic. Examples (la), (lb) and
 (lc) are telic, (Id) and (le) are atelic:
 (1)a. The bullet hit the target.
 b. Sheila collapsed.
 c. Sheila deliberately swam for 2 hours.
 d. Sheila is working in the garden.
 e. Sheila lives in Vienna.
 A sentence is bounded if it represents a situation as having reached a
 temporal boundary, irrespective of whether the situation has an intended
 or inherent endpoint or not. It is unbounded if it does not represent a
 situation as having reached a temporal boundary. The examples in (2a)
 to (2d) are bounded sentences, those in (2e) and (2f) are unbounded:
 (2)a. I met John at 5 o'clock.
 b. Judith played in the garden for an hour.
 c. Julian lived in Paris from 1979 until May 1980.
 d. I have lived in Paris.
 e. She lives on the comer of Russell Square.
 f. She is writing a nursery rhyme.
 In (2a), the nature of the situation is such that we know it takes up a
 limited amount of time. This example shows that there need not be an
 explicit indication that the situation has ended in order for a sentence to
 be bounded: the punctual character of the clause, together with the use
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 4 ILSE DEPRAETERE
 of a non-progressive form, determines the boundedness of the sentence.
 In (2b) and (2c), the adverbials impose temporal boundaries. In (2d), the
 tense used indicates that there are temporal boundaries to the situation;
 the bounded character of (2d) is the result of the use of a perfect tense.4
 It is a matter of debate whether (a)telicity is a characteristic of a sen
 tence, a predication or a situation. Strictly speaking, it is a situation as it
 is represented in a sentence rather than the clause or the situation as such
 that is telic or atelic, i.e., the speaker is free to decide how he will refer
 to a particular situation he observes (cf. e.g., Dahl 1981, p. 83; Declerck
 1979, p. 764; Hatav 1989, p. 498; Moens 1987, p. 59; Smith 1982, p. 169).
 For instance, if a child is painting, this situation may be referred to by
 means of the sentence Susan is painting a picture (telic) as well as Susan
 is painting (atelic). From that point of view, (a)telicity characterizes a
 description of a situation. As the subject of the clause also affects (a)telic
 ity (e.g., changing a singular NP into a plural NP may coincide with a
 change in (a)telicity), I consider (a)telicity to be a property of a sentence.
 The same comment applies to boundedness; it is a matter of choice on
 the part of the hearer how he will represent a particular situation:
 (3)a. Judith played in the garden for an hour. (bounded)
 b. Julian lived in Paris from February 1989 until May 1989.
 (bounded)
 (4)a. Judith was playing in the garden in the course of the afternoon.
 (unbounded)
 b. Julian lived in Paris at the time. (unbounded)
 The sentences in (3) may refer to the same situations as the correspond
 ing sentences in (4): in the latter case they are not represented as having
 ended, whereas in the former case they are. However, as Smith (1991, p.
 126-127) correctly points out, contextual information and mutual know
 ledge may impose restrictions on how a particular situation is referred to.
 For reasons of simplicity, I will sometimes use the phrase the situation is
 (un)bounded/(a)telic instead of the more accurate phrase the situation as
 it is represented in a particular sentence is (un)bounded/(a)telic. (Un)
 boundedness and (a)telicity differ in the following respects:
 a. The (a)telic character of a sentence, unlike (un)boundedness, is not
 affected by the progressive. The following examples are telic, irrespective
 of whether or not a progressive verb form is used:
 4 As will be pointed out below, it is a matter of debate whether or not a sentence with a
 perfect referring to a situation that starts in the past and leads up to the present is bounded
 to the right.
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 (UN) BOUNDEDNESS AND (A)TELICITY 5
 (5)a. John opened the parcel. (telic bounded)
 b. John was opening the parcel. (telic unbounded)
 (6)a. Ten firecrackers exploded (telic bounded)
 b. Ten firecrackers were exploding. (telic unbounded)
 However, a change from bounded to unbounded brought about by a factor
 other than the progressive may coincide with a change from telic to atelic
 (cf. (7b) and (8b)):
 (7)a. John left at eight o'clock. (telic bounded)
 b. John leaves at eight o'clock. (atelic unbounded)
 (8)a. John read a book. (telic bounded)
 b. John read books. (atelic unbounded)
 The use of a present tense in (7b) induces a repetitive reading; although
 the separate cases when John leaves are in themselves telic, the habit as
 such is not. In (8b), the use of a plural NP establishes an unbounded,
 atelic reading.
 b. (Un)boundedness is not to be equated with the aspectual opposition
 progressive vs. non-progressive. The progressive form indeed establishes
 an unbounded reading in most cases (cf. (9b), (10b)) (cf. Declerck 1991a,
 pp. 121-122), but this is not the only way in which an unbounded reading
 can be arrived at (cf. (9c), (10c)):
 (9)a. I ate an apple. (bounded)
 b. I was eating an apple (unbounded)
 c. John eats an apple every day. (unbounded)
 (10)a. John lived in London for a year. (bounded)
 b. John is living in London. (unbounded)
 c. John lives in London. (unbounded)
 Moreover, not all progressive sentences are unbounded:
 (11)a. A: Why are your hands so dirty?
 B: I've been playing in the mud. (bounded)
 b. A: Her eyes are red.
 B: She's been crying. (bounded)
 In sentences like these, the effect of the progressive is overruled by the
 bounded reading established by the present perfect. Most discussions
 about taxonomies of the type under discussion centre around the question
 of (a)telicity (Aktionsart). (Un)boundedness as we have defined it has not
 received much attention in English linguistics. The following factors often
 make it difficult to determine which concept is being discussed:
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 6 ILSE DEPRAETERE
 a. The examples given to illustrate the different classes are usually
 bounded telic or unbounded atelic.
 b. The factors that determine the classification (NPs, PPs,.. .) very often
 affect (un)boundedness as well as (a)telicity.
 c. There is a divergence in the nature of the tests used to distinguish
 between, for instance, states, activities, accomplishments and achieve
 ments: some tests enable us to classify a sentence as telic or atelic, others
 enable us to classify a sentence as bounded or unbounded, while still
 others apply to (a)telicity as well as (un)boundedness.5
 As is clear from the examples given so far, (un)boundedness and (a)tel
 icity indeed coincide very often. Before going into the necessity of a
 double distinction, we will compare our approach with that of Dahl (1981)
 and Moens (1987).
 3. (UN)BOUNDEDNESS AND (A)TELICITY IN SOME
 OTHER WORKS
 The number of linguists who have argued in favour of a double distinction
 is limited. Still, it may be interesting to see to what extent the double
 distinction Dahl (1981) and Moens (1987) make corresponds to what is
 here called (un)boundedness and (a)telicity.
 3.1. Dahl (1981)
 At first sight, Dahl's (1981) distinction between sentences having the P
 property and those having the T property appears to be related to the
 distinction between (un)boundedness and (a)telicity made here. 'A situ
 ation, process, action, etc. or the verb, verb phrase, sentence, etc. express
 ing this situation, etc. has the T property iff ( ...) it is directed toward
 attaining a goal or limit at which the action exhausts itself and passes into
 something else' (1982, p. 81). 'A situation, process, action, etc.' has the
 P property iff it has the T property and the goal, limit, or terminal point
 s A test often used to capture the difference between situation types is the following: if a
 sentence can be used in answer to the question 'How long does it take X to X?' it is an
 accomplishment or achievement. Activities and states can be used in answer to the question
 'For how long?'. However, one runs into problems with telic sentences with a progressive
 form, as they do not collocate with an in-adverbial:
 (i) ?? He was pushing the cart into the barn in 15 minutes.
 In other words, this test reveals something about the (un)boundedness rather than the
 (a)telicity of a sentence, unless one explicitly points out that the test should only be applied
 to non-progressive sentences.
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 (UN) BOUNDEDNESS AND (A)TELICITY 7
 in question is or is claimed to be actually reached' (1981, p. 82). Dahl
 summarizes the possible combinations of the P property and the T pro
 perty as follows (1981, p. 82):
 not-T T
 not-P I was writing I was writing a letter
 P (does not occur) I wrote a letter
 However, some of Dahl's claims are not compatible with our approach:
 a. 'The P property entails the T property' (1981, p.82). If the P property
 corresponded to (un)boundedness and the T property to (a)telicity, this
 would imply that all bounded sentences are telic, which is definitely not
 the case (cf. (1Oa) and (11)).6 The line of reasoning behind this claim
 seems to be that if a situation does not have an inherent endpoint, no
 endpoint can be reached. We have argued, however, that a particular
 situation may have actual temporal boundaries even if there is no inherent
 or intended endpoint to the situation.
 b. 'Verb phrases that do not have the T property are always imperfective,
 whereas verb phrases that have the T property are perfective or imper
 fective according to whether they have the P property or not' (1981, p.
 82). This observation suggests that the P property stands for (im)per
 fectiveness. As perfectiveness/imperfectiveness applied to a language such
 as English corresponds to the non-progressive/progressive distinction, it
 follows that the P property is not synonymous with (un)boundedness: as
 pointed out before, (un)boundedness should not be equated with the
 progressive/non-progressive opposition.
 These two observations make it sufficiently clear that our (un)
 boundedness is not synonymous with Dahl's P property.
 3.2. Moens (1987)
 Moens proposes the following taxonomy:
 6 (lOa) will be classified as telic if it was John's aim to stay in London for a year, for instance,
 in order to qualify for a permanent residence permit.
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 EVENTS STATES
 atomic extended
 +conseq CULMINATION CULMINATED
 PROCESS
 recognize, spot build a house
 win the race eat a sandwich understand,
 love, know
 -conseq POINT PROCESS resemble
 hiccough, run, swim, walk
 tap, wink play the piano
 He writes: 'Events will be referred to as "bounded" in that they are
 supposed to start and end at relatively precise points in time' (1987, pp.
 57-58); if they have consequences they are telic (1987, p. 58). 'States are
 "unbounded" since (...) no reference is made to their start and end
 points' (1987, p. 58).
 The following are certain respects in which our approaches differ:
 a. As bounded situations are 'supposed to start and end at relatively
 precise points in time' (i.e., there is no reference to the actual reaching
 of a terminal point), Moens' definition of boundedness seems to corre
 spond with what we call telicity. However, in our approach, not all of
 Moens' classes subsumed under the category of events (i.e., culmination,
 culminated process, point, process) are inherently telic (in our sense),
 which they are in Moens' opinion.7
 b. Even if Moens' boundedness corresponds with what we understand by
 the concept boundedness, our approaches are still incompatible as not all
 of Moens' classes subsumed under the category of events are inherently
 bounded (in our sense), which they are in Moens' opinion.
 c. As pointed out above, Moens subdivides the event-categories into those
 that have consequences and those that do not. The former are telic, the
 latter atelic. The consequences can be referred to by means of a perfect
 tense. Moens then draws the conclusion that what he calls atelic events
 7 This comparison exemplifies the terminological confusion which characterizes the Aktion
 sart discussions: Moens' use of the term bounded could either correspond to what we call
 bounded or telic. His use of the term telic diverges from ours in that he reserves it for
 situations that have consequences, i.e., it indicates a subclass of what we call telic situations.
 On our approach, situations need not necessarily bring about a change of state (e.g., The
 light flashed) in order to be called telic situations.
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 cannot be used in a perfect tense sentence: 'Atelic extended events extend
 in time without such a final point. Because of this, they do not allow
 reference to consequences, as can be seen from the infelicity of I have
 just worked in the garden. Of course, I have worked in the garden can be
 used felicitously, for example in the case where work in the garden de
 scribes a particular job that had to be carried out. In this context, work
 in the garden has a particular terminal point associated with it; the perfect
 can then be used to refer to the consequences associated with this telic
 event' (1987, p. 58). If one adopts such an approach, it means that sen
 tences such as I have lived in London, The guests have complained about
 the bad service should all be unacceptable, as they combine a perfect tense
 with a non-culminated process.
 4. EFFECT OF NPs, PPS AND TENSE ON (UN)BOUNDEDNESS
 AND (A)TELICITY
 Every effort has been made to list the factors which influence the classifi
 cation of a sentence as an accomplishment, achievement, activity or state.
 As most discussions concentrate on the effect of particular constituents
 on the Aktionsart of a sentence, it is interesting to check whether they
 also influence the (un)boundedness of the sentence. Ever since Verkuyl
 (1972), linguists have been eager to point out that NPs affect a sentence's
 classification as telic or atelic (cf. e.g., Binnick 1991, p. 191; Brinton 1988,
 pp. 26, 45-50; Dowty 1986, p. 39; HeinimSki 1978, pp. 9-10; Mittwoch
 1980, pp. 206, 211; Moens 1987, pp. 150-151; Mommer 1986, pp. 61-62,
 80-83; Shi 1990, pp. 48-50; Zydatiss 1976, pp. 67-69, 95-96, 131). NPs
 affect (un)boundedness indirectly: if a NP has the effect of turning an
 atelic proposition into a telic one, and if the telic proposition is used in a
 non-progressive sentence, the latter will be bounded:
 (12)a. Petrol was leaking out of the tank. (atelic unbounded)
 b. The petrol was leaking out of the tank. (telic unbounded)
 c. The petrol leaked out of the tank. (telic bounded)
 The use of a mass noun in an indefinite NP in (12a) makes the sentence
 atelic. The following examples also illustrate the effect of the NP:
 (13)a. I ate several apples. (bounded telic)
 b. I ate an apple. (bounded telic)
 c. I ate apples. (unbounded atelic)
 The sentence in (13a) raises the question of how explicit the indication of
 a boundary should be in order for a sentence to be classified as bounded.
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 The NP several apples implies, but does not necessarily indicate a limited
 number. However, as there is an implication of limitation, sentence (13a)
 may be classified as bounded. The following sentence from Shi (1990) is
 an interesting one:
 (14) Tourists drank the milk in an hour. (1990, p.49)
 This sentence can be interpreted in several ways:
 a. There may be reference to a number of subsituations following each
 other. Tourists drank milk one after the other and it took each tourist an
 hour to drink the milk. Once one tourist had drunk his milk, the next
 tourist started drinking. The subsituations are bounded (and telic), the
 whole situation is unbounded (and atelic), as the subject NP does not
 indicate a limited number of tourists.
 b. Another possible interpretation is that it took each tourist an hour to
 drink the milk but the subsituations occurred at the same time, for in
 stance, the tourists all started drinking at 9 o'clock and finished drinking
 at 10 o'clock. A limited number of tourists is implied. The situation is
 represented as bounded and telic.
 c. A third possibility is that the different tourists drank milk for e.g., five
 minutes. Once one tourist had finished drinking, the next one started
 drinking and the whole process took one hour of time. Again, there is an
 implicit limit on the number of tourists. The situation is represented as
 bounded and telic.
 It has already been pointed out that (a)telicity and (un)boundedness
 characterize descriptions of situations and that from that point of view a
 particular situation is not inherently (a)telic or (un)bounded. Conversely,
 the sentence in (14) shows that one sentence may be ambiguous, it may
 be used to represent several situations. Another point which needs to be
 added in this respect is that the changes effected by a particular feature
 often result in the sentence referring to a different extra-linguistic reality.
 When discussing the factors that influence the categorization, linguists
 indeed seem to lose sight of this non-trivial proviso: although changing a
 singular NP into a plural NP, for instance, is likely to change a sentence's
 classification as bounded/unbounded or telic/atelic, it may also result in
 the sentence no longer capturing a particular situation. Although theoreti
 cally, the speaker can choose freely how a particular situation will be
 represented, the freedom is not complete because the situation imposes
 constraints on the linguistic material by which it can be represented (cf.
 supra). This observation applies to all the features possibly influencing
 (un)boundedness and (a)telicity. The following example may clarify the
 point made: if someone is reading a book, one might refer to that parti
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 cular situation by means of either John is reading (atelic unbounded) or
 John is reading a book (telic unbounded): the addition of the direct object
 coincides with a change from atelic to telic. Changing the singular NP into
 a plural NP turns the sentence into an atelic unbounded statement: John
 reads books. However, if John is not in the habit of reading books, this
 statement is no longer a truthful presentation of the situation, although it
 does illustrate that NPs affect (a)telicity and (un)boundedness.
 As is well-known, the influence of directional PPs on (un)boundedness
 is similar to that of NPs. A change from atelic to telic brought about by the
 addition of a directional PP will coincide with a change from unbounded to
 bounded provided the sentence is non-progressive:
 (15)a. John pushed the cart. (-directional PP) (unbounded atelic)
 b. John pushed the cart into the barn. (+directional PP) (bounded
 telic)
 c. John was pushing the cart into the barn. (+directional PP)
 (unbounded telic)
 The following example shows that the use of plural NP may override the
 bounding effect of the directional PP:
 (15)d. John pushed carts into the barn. (+ directional PP) (atelic
 unbounded)
 If the tense-Aktionsart interaction has been touched upon at all, it
 relates to the effect of the present tense. The following examples have
 been given to illustrate how this particular tense may change the Aktion
 sart of a sentence:
 (16)a. John wrote a good book.
 b. John writes a good book. (Moens 1987, p. 54)
 Moens comments: 'The example in [16b] will be interpreted as expressing
 a dispositional or habitual state of affairs, whereas [16a] will normally be
 interpreted as a description of a one-off event. It is clearly the difference
 in tense which accomplishes this aspectual distinction' (Moens 1987, p.
 54). Mommer (1986, p. 88) and Vasudeva (1971, p. 128) give similar
 examples showing that the use of a present tense instead of a past tense
 may coincide with a change from a single event reading to a series reading:
 (17)a. Nick crossed the Graffiti Bridge. (Mommer 1986, p. 88) (telic
 bounded)8
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 b. Nick crosses the Graffiti Bridge. (atelic unbounded)
 (18)a. He arrived late. (telic bounded) (Vasudeva 1971, p. 128)
 b. He arrives late. (atelic unbounded)
 The use of a non-progressive present tense to refer to present time events
 is restricted to 'instantaneous' situations (cf. Leech 1971, pp. 6-7). The
 present tense is usually reserved to refer to habits or states. As an event
 interpretation of a present tense is marked, sentences of the type given
 in (16b) to (18b) are likely to be given a habitual interpretation. In other
 words, it is because the present tense triggers a habitual reading that
 the sentence is classified as atelic and unbounded: although the separate
 occasions on which, for instance, Nick crosses the Graffiti Bridge are telic
 and bounded, the habit or series of instances as such is not. From this it
 follows that any factor which induces a habitual reading will affect a
 sentence's classification in terms of (un)boundedness and (a)telicity. This
 line of reasoning also implies that if a habitual reading is given to the
 sentences in (16a) to (18a), they will not be considered as bounded and
 telic either, but rather as unbounded and atelic. It still needs to be added
 that a habit or repetitive situation is not inherently atelic and unbounded.
 A repetitive situation can also be telic, i.e., if the number of times the
 situation holds is predetermined. John went to London five times is telic
 if it was John's aim to go there five times. John went to London five times
 a year will be classified as atelic and unbounded unless the period during
 which he had this habit is given in the context.
 Bauer has pointed out that the use of a perfect tense results in a situation
 being represented as 'an accomplished fact' (Bauer 1970, p. 192; cf. also
 Smith 1991, p. 148). Although the use of the perfect affects (un)
 boundedness, it does not affect a sentence's aspect or Aktionsart, as the
 above linguist seems to suggest. The following examples show that the
 use of a non-progressive perfect tense may turn an unbounded sentence
 into a bounded one:
 (19)a. John too loves Mary. (unbounded atelic)
 b. John too loved Mary. (unbounded atelic)
 c. John too will love Mary. (unbounded atelic)
 d. John too has loved Mary. (bounded atelic)
 8 The sentence in (17a) either refers to a single event or to a habitual situation. In the latter
 case, it is atelic. However, most telic sentences can be given a repetitive reading and therefore
 be classified as atelic. In the discussion which follows, sentences of this type will be considered
 to be telic, unless there is an explicit indication that repetition is involved. A similar line of
 reasoning applies to example (18a).
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 e. At that time, it was clear that John too had loved Mary.
 (bounded atelic)
 (20)a. John plays football. (unbounded atelic)
 b. John played football. (unbounded atelic)
 c. John will play football. (unbounded atelic)
 d. John has played football. (bounded atelic)
 e. It was clear that John had played football. (bounded atelic)
 The non-progressive perfect sentences in (19) and (20) differ from the
 other examples in that they represent a situation as bounded. This obser
 vation has important consequences for the expression of temporal relations
 in past time sentences. Before illustrating this claim, the following point
 needs to be made. In the examples in (19) and (20), the perfect tense is
 of the 'indefinite' type (Declerck 1991a, p. 28), i.e., the perfect is interpre
 ted as referring to a situation lying completely before the moment of
 speaking. There is also the question of how sentences with a 'continuative'
 perfect (Declerck 1991a, p. 31) (i.e., a perfect interpreted as referring to
 a situation that starts before the time of speaking and leads up to it)
 should be classified. In sentences of this type, the left boundary is explicitly
 mentioned and a right boundary is implicit in the structure of the continu
 ative perfect itself, i.e., a situation starts in the past and leads up to now.
 However, the situation is not represented as ending, which explains why
 sentences with a continuative perfect may be said to be bounded to the
 left and unbounded to the right (cf. also Declerck 1991b, p. 100):
 (21)a. I have lived here since 1985.
 b. I have been waiting for you since 8 o'clock.
 Although the situations in (21a) and (21b) are represented as having the
 moment of speaking as their right-hand boundary, they are not repre
 sented as ending at that particular moment.
 5. THE RELEVANCE OF (UN)BOUNDEDNESS AND (A)TELICITY
 TO THE ANALYSIS OF TENSE AND ASPECT
 It is widely known that (a)telicity is important for aspect. Every grammar
 dealing with the progressive points out that there are constraints on the
 use of a progressive form related to the type of situation referred to in
 the sentence.
 Having listed some of the factors that influence a sentence's classification
 as bounded or unbounded, we are now also in a position to demonstrate
 why (un)boundedness is important for the use of tense. It is generally
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 known that reference to a situation that is anterior to a past reference
 time does not always require the use of a past perfect. The past tense is
 interchangeable with the past perfect provided the temporal relation of
 anteriority is not blurred:
 (22) He confessed he had been (was) very lonely when he lived in
 London.
 However, substituting the past perfect for a past tense sometimes affects
 the temporal relation between two situations, as is clear from example
 (23):
 (23)a. Now that she was alone she lost all the inhibitions which had
 confined the poetry in her soul.
 b. Now that she was alone she lost all the inhibitions which con
 fined the poetry in her soul.
 The past perfect refers to a period of time lying completely before the
 main clause situation whereas the past tense represents the relative clause
 situation as a state that is simultaneous with the main clause situation. A
 similar comment applies to the restrictive relative clause example in (24):
 (24)a. He suddenly knew envy for the easy happiness with which she
 had returned to life, while his own return was so lonely and
 uneasy.
 b. He suddenly knew envy for the easy happiness with which she
 returned to life, while his own return was so lonely and uneasy.
 The past perfect suggests that the process of returning to life is completely
 over, 'she is back in life'. When the past tense is used (24b), the process
 of returning to life is represented as going on at the time of the main
 clause situation: the relative clause situation is simultaneous with the main
 clause situation. The generalization to be derived from examples (23)
 and (24) is that whenever there is no pragmatic, especially contextual
 information which safeguards a correct temporal interpretation, changing
 a past perfect sentence with an atelic verb into a past tense sentence will
 coincide with a change from bounded to unbounded. This results in a
 change in temporal interpretation, i.e., the anteriority relation changes
 into a simultaneity relation. In other words, the notion (un)boundedness
 explains why there is a constraint on the interchangeability of the past
 tense and the past perfect to refer to an anterior situation.
 (Un)boundedness is also the factor which determines whether a situ
 ation belongs to the foreground or background of a text. The foreground
 of a text is constituted by the sequence of chronologically ordered situ
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 ations. The two basic characteristics determining the foreground/back
 ground status of a sentence are usually said to be the following:
 1. Achievements/accomplishments belong to the foreground,
 states/activities belong to the background. (cf. Hinrichs 1986,
 p. 68)
 2. Main clauses carry the action forward, subclauses do not. (cf.
 Labov and Waletzky 1967, p. 21; Reinhart 1984, p. 796)
 The following examples, in which the foregrounded clauses are italicized,
 illustrate how the distinction should be understood:
 (25)a. [Dozing a little, Alleyn sat slumped forward in his seat] A
 violent jerk woke him. The train had slowed down. He wiped
 the misty windowpane, shaded his eyes, and tried to look out
 into this new country. The moon had risen. He saw arching
 hills, stumps of burnt trees, some misty whiteflowering scrub,
 and a lonely road. It was very remote and strange... He
 turned to see Susan dab at her eyes with a handkerchief. She
 gave him a deprecatory smile. (Dry 1981, p. 234).
 b. Nick opened the door and went into the room. Ole Anderson
 was lying on the bed with all his clothes on. He had been a
 heavyweight prizefighter and he was too long for the bed. He
 lay with his head on two pillows. He did not look at Nick.
 'What was it?' he asked. (Reinhart 1984, p. 783)
 In spite of the fact that most of the rules of foregrounding are formulated
 in terms of the Vendlerian Aktionsart classes (achievement, accomplish
 ment, state, activity), it is in fact (un)boundedness which determines
 whether or not the action is pushed forward. The question whether it is
 (a)telic sentences rather than (un)bounded sentences which are important
 for foregrounding has not gone entirely unnoticed. Hatav (1989), for
 instance, argues that what I call bounded atelic sentences may be 'located
 on the time line' (i.e., may push the action forward). She puts it as follows:
 'Situations have end points iff they are contained in their RT [reference
 time], and only such situations can appear on the time line. Events are
 always contained in their R-time and hence are always candidates for the
 time line, but states are contained in it only when (a) they are interpreted
 as inchoatives or (b) their duration is restricted by overt linguistic marking,
 for example, adverbials such as 'for three hours" (1989, p. 487). In her
 opinion, it is the reference to the temporal boundary of a situation which
 determines whether a situation appears on the time line or not. The logical
 outcome of such an approach is that bounded states or activities (i.e.,
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 bounded atelic sentences) may also be foregrounded (1989, p. 487). Hatav
 illustrates her claim with examples from Biblical Hebrew, Russian and
 French:
 (26) Quand on fut ext6nud, on fit la paix. (Hatav 1989, p. 491)
 The first clause is bounded to the right. This sentence means that peace
 can only be made once a certain stage has been reached, i.e., when they
 are exhausted. This implies reference to a point of transition: they no
 longer feel like fighting (=end-point), they are tired (=initial point). In
 other words, the example in (26) is not bounded on both sides. Even so,
 the fact that such situations may belong to the foreground can already be
 taken as an indication that the important criterion is indeed (un)
 boundedness rather than (a)telicity. Couper-Kuhlen (1987, p. 16) ex
 plicitly points out that (a)telicity is too narrow a concept to account for
 all the examples containing foregrounded clauses and therefore she rejects
 Nerbonne's idea that (a)telicity is the determining factor. Couper-Kuhlen's
 examples should prove that 'certain non-telic predicates will also be under
 stood to refer to events in succession in narration' (Couper-Kuhlen 1987,
 p. 16):
 (27) The balloon popped. The child jumped. (Couper-Kuhlen 1987,
 p. 16)
 The first clause is bounded telic. If the second clause is interpreted as a
 single action (bounded telic), there is reference to a sequence. However,
 the second clause could also refer to an iterative situation, in which case
 the child starts jumping as a result of the sudden explosion of the balloon,
 i.e., the second situation is bounded to the left. A similar comment applies
 to the following example:
 (28) The guide looked up at the sky. The tourists looked up at the
 sky.
 If the situations in (28) are interpreted as telic and bounded, there is
 reference to a sequence: the guide looks up at the sky and as a result all
 the tourists look up at the sky. The difference with the example in (27)
 is that the situation referred to in (28) is a 'punktuelle Veranderung'
 (Schopf 1984, p. 103), i.e., it refers to an action plus a resulting state of
 affairs, that in the second sentence in (27) is a 'punktuelles Ereignis'
 (Schopf 1984, p. 99). The course of events in (28) could be represented
 as follows:
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 x
 x-.
 On the bounded telic reading, the actions of looking up at the sky follow
 each other, the resulting states are simultaneous. When look up at the sky
 is interpreted as atelic and unbounded, the situations occur simulta
 neously. In other words, Couper-Kuhlen's examples are not unequivocally
 bounded on both sides either. Aristar Dry (1983) also touches upon the
 (un)boundedness-(a)telicity issue. When describing the factors which re
 sult in a situation being understood as foregrounded, Aristar Dry (1983)
 rejects the view expressed in an earlier article of hers (Dry 1981) that it
 is a change of state that pushes the action forward: 'Although that as
 sertion is true within limits, I have come to see that it should be broadened:
 references to changes of states necessarily constitute references to points
 - the beginning and ending points of situations - but sentences like (5)
 indicate that reference to sequenced points which are not changes of state
 also trigger perception of time movement:
 (5)a. At twelve the sky was threatening (b) and at one there was no
 change.
 So this paper argues that those constructions that move time refer to
 sequenced points, not changes of state' (Dry 1983, p. 23). Although Dry
 does not use the terms (a)telic or (un)bounded, the following quote also
 indicates that it is (un)boundedness she has in mind: 'It is reference to
 sequenced temporal points which triggers the illusion of time movement;
 and [... ] the points most often referred to are initial and final points of
 situations' (1983, p. 47). The above observations prove that foregrounding
 should be formulated in terms of (un)boundedness rather than (a)telicity
 or Vendlerian situation types (cf. also Declerck 1991a, pp. 124-125, 138).
 However, the examples with which that claim has so far been substantiated
 are not bounded 'on both sides'; the states or activities in (26) to (28) are
 bounded to the left/right. The examples in (29) do contain bounded atelic
 situations and show that they may indeed belong to the foreground:
 (29)a. There was a small ivory push button beside the door marked
 '405'. I pushed it (...) and waited for what seemed a long
 time. Then the door opened noiselessly about a foot. (Couper
 Kuhlen 1989, pp. 15-16)
 b. He signed a contract with IBM, for whom he worked for three
 years.
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 6. CONCLUSION
 This article provides evidence for the necessity of a distinction between
 potential endpoints and actual temporal boundaries, the former notion
 being captured by (a)telicity, the latter by (un)boundedness. A comparison
 has been made between this double distinction, first introduced by De
 clerck (1989), and those made by Dahl (1981) and Moens (1986). Having
 examined how NPs, directional PPs and tense affect a sentence's classifica
 tion as bounded or unbounded, we have been able to demonstrate that
 (un)boundedness is important for the use of tense and the interpretation
 of temporal relations in English.
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